In response to a recent email I've mulled over a blogpost that ponders 5-6 topics, at the interface of business and society, that might be good research topics for students.
But it is Sunday night -- so I mention only one: is there anything that large project corporates (mining and energy) operating in less-developed settings might learn, by analogy, from the experience of UN and coalition-type forces in drawing-down or exiting fragile and / or post-conflict states and situations?
Richard Caplan launched his latest edited collection Exit Strategies and Statebuilding (OUP, 2012) recently, here in Oxford. Such literature deals with statebuilding projects by foreign powers typically following armed interventions such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The analogy? Well I think there is scope for more research on what is involved in large extractive industry operators scaling-back or exiting certain settings, and wonder if the 'exiting statebuilding' literature holds some possible insights.
Of course the analogy has many holes, in particular because international statebuilders (at least UN-mandated multidimensional peace operations involved, at some level, in building and supporting the institutions of conflict-affected states) are exercising public authority and responsibility; firms are not doing so even though they may cooperate closely with local government officials or become de facto local public service-providers. Nevertheless, mega-projects in often remote parts of under-developed regions in Africa often become important sites for wider social and economic activity. That is, a major project does not have to reach the scale of a 'state-within-a-state (like Firestone's Harbel plantation in Liberia) to nevertheless be, or promise to be, a major developmental node in its area. This makes the winding-down of such a site a significant and challenging event for such settings.
Caplan's recent book is not the only relevant 'hook' for blogging on this now; the other is how mineral-rich, politically-fragile Guinea is still absorbing the implications of the (also recent) decision by mining giant Vale to suspend its Zogota iron ore mega-project given difficult global conditions in the sector. This project was seen as a major pillar in supporting the country's continuing post-2010 recovery from five decades of corrupt, authoritarian and arbitrary rule.
I've blogged about what might be called 'the Zogota syndrome' before -- see the tail end of this post here:
* 'No mining!' Some mining-related community protests, such as in Peru and elsewhere, can be crudely characterised as largely opposed to a mine's operation at all, where locals see or expect no net benefit.
* 'No mining?' By contrast the Zogota syndrome involves another form of problem, whereby far from opposing mining operations, communities protest because the mine is not in fact going ahead as planned, and employment and other prospects will not be met.
I see so much of the literature on corporate responsibility, mining-as-development, social license to operate, etc as focussing on two areas of social invesment: entry / exploration / start-up, and normal operations. But while there is a solid literature on regeneration and restoration activities at the end of a mine's life, a third area is relatively neglected: the considerations of strategy (and principle) involved where social and political expectations of mining-related benefits will not be met because the operation is mothballed or stalled significantly. If we're approaching the end of a commodities super-cycle, the Zogota-style ('do not go!') protest above may prove more common than the anti-mining form of social protest, raising potential reputational and other risks for firms.
What might the experiences of military and civilian contingents in exiting statebuilding operations suggest for firms exiting major projects? I look forward to reading someone's research on this!
One theme of the statebuilding literature (see Charles Call's work, for example) will be applicable: the debate on what counts as 'success' in such endeavours, thus enabling exit. Who defines success or completion -- the statebuilding authority or the 'recipient' population / government? In the mining or energy firm analogy, what a firm sees as adequate provisions for its drawdown in operations may fall far below local expectations, provoking resistance to the exit. Such 'exit-resistance' might be just as heated as the resistance often encountered to the entry or operation of such projects.
The corporate responsibility / social investment literature arguably focusses too much on the up-front questions and places too little emphasis on the back-end of projects, the exit phase; in such situations familiar questions such as the division of roles between company and host government will become particularly acute -- especially where the latter was looking to the former to provide the sort of services and opportunities that will now not be forthcoming.
Jo
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