Business and Human Rights: legacy and trajectory

Is there an unstoppable meta-trend towards greater corporate responsibility and accountability for human rights impacts?

In my Masters course on 'Business and Human Rights' (BHR, currently afoot), I offer students a timeline of BHR. This begins with colonisation (where private listed companies sometimes led) up to the current Geneva UN negotiation towards a BHR treaty. I ask them, among other things, the question above.

The most significant positive event on the timeline, without doubt, is the unanimous endorsement in 2011 by state members of the UN Human Rights Council of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, based on a related 2008 Framework of differentiated responsibilities. This was a remarkable achievement given the difficulties of erecting a global normative framework and narrative for business responsibility, and decades of toxic, divisive ideological debate in UN forums on the issue. 

Professor John Ruggie, who led the process that produced the Principles, has sadly died.

Of the many tributes and comments circulating among BHR scholars and others, these two below best capture, to my mind, the significance of Ruggie's achievement in 2011, especially given the legacy of inaction and division before 2005-2011. In particular, the significance of his work lay in the consciousness that there is no silver bullet for closing the 'governance gap' between corporate impact and corporate responsibility: a mix of measures is needed, drawing on the inputs and incentives of various actors within this regulatory ecosystem, but without obscuring that states are the ultimate duty-bearers, their national legal systems the foundation of regulatory action.

We all mourn and will miss him.

Comment 1 (Muchlinski)

A great reformer has passed. John understood what should be done and, so importantly, what could be done. As a result we have moved forward hugely in the field of business and human rights. I am old enough to remember times when talk of business having human rights obligations would be treated with polite disdain. That changed in the 1990s leading to the first international iteration of business responsibility for human rights in the UN Global Compact, of which John was one of the leading architects. Then came the impasse over the UN Norms. John was called upon by Kofi Annan to unblock the situation. He started from first principles and concrete evidence based assessments of what should, and could, be done. He was motivated by an understanding of how different methods can be used together to move forward change – formal regulation, civil society pressure and self-regulation. He has been criticised for not going far enough. That’s not the point. He got us further than anyone might have hoped in 2005. We have much to learn from his wisdom and genuine moral commitment. Thank you, John, for an outstanding lifetime of scholarship and public service.

Comment 2 (Orentlicher)

I can’t imagine a world in which those working on business and human rights are unable to turn to John for guidance. After seeing news of his passing, I re-read e-mail exchanges from the early period of his work as [UN Special Representative on BHR], and was reminded how astonishingly different this space was when he began his mandate—which is to say, I was reminded anew of how profoundly he transformed it. In an e-mail from November 2005, John aptly captured the prevailing state of play when he described a then-recent extractive industries consultation, noting “it proved impossible to have a serious discussion about standards because for the NGOs that meant the Norms and for business the Norms meant warfare.” From this starting point (and ongoing necessary debates notwithstanding), John managed to forge a remarkable measure of consensus around a brilliant core of actionable insights—standards that provided a foundation for the immense work that remained/remains to be done.

Business and Human Rights: the Future

How powerful is a 'human rights' framing in terms of the overall 'responsible business' agenda?

Next year will be a decade since the rare unanimous endorsement by the UN Human Rights Council of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs / BHR).

The UN Working Group on BHR has set up an open consultation to take stock of the impact and implementation of the UNGPs and -- in very UN-speak -- chart a 'roadmap' for the UNGPs over the next decade to 2030.

Much could be written about the UNGPs including on the extent or otherwise of their uptake over the last decade.

For one thing -- as some previous posts have hinted at, and as my next post will cover -- they really do not appear to have gained particular traction in terms of the search by governments, Big Tech, civil society and others for suitable and legitimate frameworks for the governance of responsible AI and other new technologies.

Here I will limit my observations to one impression from the consultation concept note. I wonder whether this puts too great an expectation on the transformative, emancipatory, or remedial power of 'human rights' as a vector for governance and change.

The concept note mentions the UNGPs in the context of 'sustainable development and stability' (notably climate change), rising inequalities and pervasive corruption; rapid technological change... widespread fragility, conflict and violence...'. It includes a call to embed the UNGPs more concretely in climate change and sustainability debates. It is one thing to draw attention to complex inter-linkages (e.g. the UNGPs with the SDGs), but it may be another to envisage that human rights-based approaches and arguments ought to be at the heart of the range of issues raised in the note. For one thing, business may be daunted enough by the scope of the UNGPs agenda even narrowly framed, and wary of 'responsibility creep'.

Others have written on the secular decline of 'human rights' as a powerful framework for socio-political action (e.g. Hopgood 2013, Posner 2014; Moyn 2010+; compare e.g. Sikkink 2018).

Yet one doesn't have to subscribe to the 'end-times / twilight of human rights' school to recognise that while there are obvious intersections with issues such as climate change or corporate taxation, it remains far from obvious that simply re-framing those debates in human rights terms suddenly gives them far greater urgency, appeal, traction ... it is not obvious that business (or government) actors suddenly sit up just because a familiar claim is suddenly made in human rights terms, and the contrary can be true ... 

For my part, an 'ambitious roadmap' for the UNGPs must proceed, at least in part, from a recognition that framing an issue in terms of human rights -- especially individual rights claims against the state, or business -- is not necessarily conceptually persuasive nor a panacea in advocacy / strategy terms.

In a previous (2018) post I was deliberately provocative in asking if BHR had 'lost its way': here.

There among other things I wrote this, and reading the 2020 concept note I have the same reaction, really, and will put this out there:

"Yet the question arises whether we should be a bit more strategic about what is likely to gain traction as a BHR issue, and about how widely we frame BHR, and about what we think corporations and other enterprises really have a meaningful responsibility for.

... Just how useful and effective is the 'human rights' paradigm / lexicon in shifting business (and state) behaviour around social impact? However tempting it is to invoke it in support of all manner of worthy societal campaigns, is it really that effective?"

Investors and human rights risk

How is the investment community -- especially institutional investors -- dealing with human rights risks in investment portfolios? What do they need most in order to pursue this agenda?

Most attention in the 'business and human rights' field is on the operations and supply chains of firms of various sorts. Until recent years there has been somewhat less attention to the all-important entities in the financial sector that invest in (or indeed insure) corporate activity.

Such actors are capable, in principle, of exerting very considerable influence over the behaviours of fundee businesses -- that is, preventive and remedial conduct in relation to human rights impacts of business activities. Indeed if there is to be some notable transformative shift corporate social (and enviro) impact it is perhaps more likely to come from what investors do or require than from other stakeholders (governments/regulators, or consumer/citizens -- accepting these groups shape each others' conduct).

Today was the deadline for submissions to the UN 'Principles for Responsible Investment' consultation on a framework (here) for shaping and guiding how investors implement respect for human rights into their pre-investment, portfolio management / screening / engagement, and exit processes.

My own submission covered a range of issues on which investors -- who of course vary significantly as a broad class -- will continue to need further practical guidance, including stuff tailored to the very different types of finance and investment entities and products.

• Some of that guidance must be drawn from / shared by responsible financial sector actors themselves as they implement, learn from and refine their practices on human rights risk. For example, it is remarkably difficult to find publicly available model examples of instructions on screening investees for human rights risks, although these do exist, and investors can resort to tools such as Parametric's one on forced labour (using the MSCI basis).
• Among other things, my submission suggests PRI and others can do more work to develop practical examples, model provisions, case studies, hypotheticals. The consultation paper reads as a very conceptual piece but the aim is to inform and equip investment sector actors: the more practical examples (from / for different investor types) the better.
• The aim is also to persuade investment sector actors. People in corporate responsibility talk a lot about the 'business case' for respecting human rights (in addition to the principled basis for doing so). We see expansive claims that conducting human rights due diligence (HRDD) is an effective proxy for generic commercial and business disruption risks. The PRI paper likewise says that HRDD will "often pick up issues that, left unaddressed, would go on to become financially material..." and that "assessing a company’s human rights due diligence process can therefore also be a good way to assess its overall governance and potential future financial risk..." This is potentially persuasive. But where is the evidence, the examples, the compelling 'business case'? This 'risk proxy' argument needs more meat to engage effectively with financiers and investors as a discerning and analytical group of people.

There is one issue I think will continue to trouble investors and their advisors, and which the 'business and human rights' field (scholars, activists, etc) has not itself perhaps quite come to terms with. This is the perennial vagueness -- or is it constructive ambiguity -- around terms such as 'adverse human rights impact' or 'negative human rights outcome'. The PRI paper talks of investors avoiding activities that 'remove or reduce someone's ability to enjoy a human right'. I can get my head around this -- but I am a law professor. This language strikes me as incredibly broad in ways that is potentially unhelpful for those trying to make investment decisions. Many things one does can impact rights or reduce enjoyment thereof yet not necessarily provide a coherent basis for responsibility let alone liability. I do wonder whether the credibility (for want of a better word) of the business and human rights project is undermined by these sorts of open-ended potentially very wide-ranging terms: how are investors to work with them?

Jo

For some primer resources on investors and human rights, see Investors for Human Rights and this guidance for institutional investors (on the OECD scheme). A range of more specific guidance exists, e.g. within Australia's superannuation sector, or on particular human rights risks (e.g. modern slavery).

'Due Diligence' and Human Rights Risk

Whether or not there truly is a 'new social contract' between business and society, the trend towards grounding 'business and human rights' principles in national-level legislation continues to strengthen.

This week came news that over 20 significant companies and business organisations issued a joint statement welcoming the European Commission's April announcement that it is committed to exploring the introduction of mandatory corporate human rights (and environmental) due diligence laws.

There have been various calls for such laws, and some EU member countries have introduced or are exploring them.

No doubt this supportive, engaged stance by business actors is partly driven by the desire by leading firms both to cement their advantage and for a more level playing field: larger established firms (especially brand-sensitive ones) can only benefit requiring competitors or putative competitors to adhere to and invest in the same enviro, social and governance (ESG) standards as the incumbent players do. There are other incentives and drivers, not least the need for firms to incorporate systems to respond to the increasing orientation of institutional and other investors (e.g. see here). Some firms are also supportive out of a sense of inevitability: such laws are inevitable, we may as well have pan-EU coherence rather than a patchwork of national legislation. Some firms accept research that ties ESG performance with protecting or even increasing a firm's value.

Yet one question I ask my 'business and human rights' Masters students online this week is whether it matters, ultimately, if business / investor support for or engagement in legislative schemes is motivated by 'instrumental' (rather than 'intrinsic' value) considerations or purposes.

I ask this since a critical perspective might be that legislated 'due diligence' requirements (and perhaps more so mere reporting requirements that only imply undertaking internal due diligence processes) do not necessarily transform internal corporate management culture. At least, we remain unsure about the conditions under which this internalisation of values might take place, while such schemes can risk becoming process-oriented rather than preventive and problem-solving in nature.

There will be a robust debate about how such laws deal with penalties, and with remedy for affected groups -- but my ever-practical students are probably right in seeing support for such a regime as a very positive development.

Jo

See for example this blog series on mandatory human rights due diligence, and here for the recent comprehensive study in part underpinning the Commission's approach.

  

Modern Slavery reporting laws: a study

One way in which the 'business and human rights' agenda is manifesting in national-level laws is through legislation -- most recently in Australia -- to require larger firms to report periodically on risks of 'modern slavery' within their operations and supply chains.

We have produced a report on how Australian firms appear to be preparing to reporting under the 2018 Modern Slavery Act.

Is the Act at risk of become a mere tick-box exercise, or will it help drive a more fundamental transformation of approaches to human rights risks in supply chains:

"... Despite mixed levels of awareness, a common refrain in interviews was that the reporting requirement was a ‘conversation starter’ (including, importantly, within firms) even if not a ‘conversation changer’, although for some it had achieved the latter..."

Here is a link to the report (with M. Azizul Islam and Justine Nolan).

Jo

Ps: for some recent blogs on reporting laws on Modern Slavery, see this post (and links within).

'Ethical AI', business, and human rights

How and where does a human rights approach fit into current conversations about 'ethical Artificial Intelligence'?

I'm preparing my submission, due 31 May, to the Australian government's enquiry paper on ethical AI.

Naturally as a 'business and human rights' scholar I am among other things curious about the focus on ethical framings for these questions and issues, relative to legal and regulatory ones (including by reference to human rights concepts and law).

We're currently experiencing a cascade of words as various governmental, inter-governmental, corporate and professional bodies produce ethical frameworks. The Australian discussion paper suggests 8 core principles (fairness, accountability, explainability, etc); the recent European Commission one suggests 7 principles; Google advances 7, Microsoft 6, and so on -- all unobjectionable but inherently ambiguous, context-contingent terms / values / concepts. [See here for one recent inventory -- an attempt to list all these lists of ethical AI principles ... ]

This cascade of normative frameworks is accompanied by a tilt towards a greater focus on governmental action: a regulatory consciousness on ethical AI has been late coming, but is afoot (see here, for example: 'US to back international guidelines...'). Tech giants are calling for rather than necessarily resisting regulation.

While the gist of my upcoming May submission is that this subject-matter is about more than ethics in these sense that there's a law and regulation piece here (as useful as ethics-based approaches are, and complementary to law).

Yet in our chagrin as lawyers at the belated recognition that our discipline matters here, there is something more. These issues may be 'bigger' than ethics, but they are also bigger than and beyond just a conventional debate on law and governance. Certainly, human rights law is not necessarily and ideal vehicle for conducting and framing that debate.

What is involved around responsible innovation debates is really asking some fundamental questions about the future shape of human society. While necessary to this debate, law and especially human rights law are limited as a vernacular for having those debates.

In a seminar on May 8 I quoted Harari (2018) who rightly notes that we need a shared and coherent 'story' of what these technologies are for, how they do or do not advance a society of the sort that we want and recognise as 'good' and 'just':

".... We cannot continue this debate indefinitely … [v]ery soon someone will have to decide how to use this power [AI, etc] – based on some implicit or explicit story about the meaning of life … engineers are far less patient, and investors are the least patient of all. If you do not know what to do with the power [of these technologies, but also the power of how to govern them], market forces will not wait a thousand years for … an answer. The invisible hand of the market will force upon you its own blind reply..."

Jo

See previous posts on responsible innovation here.

Modern slavery reporting: what it is/not

Some legislative schemes have unforeseen consequences on the upside. They achieve far more than their particular remit, and capture or catalyse a wider shift.

Others generate unreasonable expectations: laws can only do so much, even in developed regulatory states, and especially without the accompaniment of more profound and clear messages from markets and people about the kinds of behavioural and cultural changes they want companies to exhibit.

Australia's Modern Slavery Act came into effect this year. It requires larger firms report annually on whether and what steps they are taking to manage these human rights risks within their operations and supply chains.

Last week the government released draft guidance for reporting entities (here).

In this context I attempt 3 propositions about what this statutory scheme may represent, and 3 things that it doesn't necessarily represent: what is it not?

'What it maybe is'

1. The Act is -- like its UK predecessor and whatever its shortcomings -- a landmark achievement in bringing to corporate boards across Australia a new awareness of the human rights risks sometimes associated with mainstream business and financial activity, and the extent of regulatory intent that exists around these.

2. The Australian Act can be seen as part of a wider pattern, at least in OECD countries, of statutory requirements to undertake human rights due diligence or at least report on such activities -- even if domestic and other regulatory manifestations of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are still very piecemeal.

3. Engagement with the Act by corporations (and their advisory firms) on this particular human rights risk may drive wider awareness and uptake of the fuller 'business and human rights' agenda, but will not necessarily do so.*

'What it perhaps is not'

1. The Act is one corporate reporting mechanism among many for big firms (and modern slavery is only one class of business & human rights issue): as the Act beds down there are no guarantees that this will remain a distinctive high-profile issue ...

2. An external reporting requirement (even one with board-level sign-off) is no guarantee that firms and funds will take and sustain effective internal procedural, operational and cultural changes relevant to preventing and remedying modern slavery risk.

3. Even fulsome corporate compliance with the Act (and internalisation of its purpose) will not necessarily have a discernible or material effect on the prevalence of modern slavery in our region.

That last point is a reminder of the risk of such legislation becoming an Australian regulatory salve for our own consciences (here).

There are many other things one could add about what the Act is not. The Act is not a panacea. The Act is not mere pandering to corporations. The Act is not victim-focused or remedial in nature.

And so on. For one thing, advocates and academics in 'business and human rights' often talk of these corporate reporting models as new. They are not. They are only new to this field, which would benefit from more research couched in lessons about what reporting requirements, and non-penal ones in particular, can and cannot do to drive progress on the underlying issue with which they deal. 

Jo

* In 2018 research with Justine Nolan and M. Azizul Islam (publication forthcoming) we observe that many corporate officers and others see the Act as, at very least, a 'conversation starter' within firms and more widely.

See here for a recent post on compliance risk under the Act, and here for a different take (modern slavery approached in verse...).

Business, human rights and responsible innovation

We are increasingly governed and influenced by algorithms and predictive analysis.

The use by governments and businesses of artificial intelligence / machine learning (AI/ML) platforms can impact on human rights in myriad ways.

We have moved from debating whether governments need to regulate AI's potential discriminatory (etc.) effects, to questions of how best to do so in a legitimate, effective and coherent way: enabling innovation while protecting fundamental values and interests.

The nexus of 'new tech' and 'human rights' is presented as an emerging issue. Yet the rate of change and the implications of AI (etc.) across so many aspects of life suggest that it is only a regulatory consciousness that is still 'emerging'. All else is well underway.

Yes, we are far from the shallows now (as Lady Gaga / Bradley Cooper sing in A Star is Born (2018)): we are well in the deep waters now of how best to regulate for responsible innovation. And those deep waters are fast-moving ones, far faster than most regulatory and legal systems have moved.

This post relates to my hasty and under-cooked submission last week to the Australian Human Rights Commission / WEF 'White Paper' on 'AI and Human Rights: Leadership and Governance', itself related to a wider consultation (2018, ongoing).

One point made in that submission was a reflection on big tech firms' approach to the regulatory question. (This post is confined to that reflection -- the responsible innovation regulatory agenda is a far bigger and more complex one.)

The Commission's reports detail how influential CEOs -- from Microsoft to Amazon to Facebook -- are all now calling for or conceding the need for governmental regulatory frameworks on ethical AI / social impact / human rights (and these are not all the same thing, as my submission notes!).

These CEOs thus recognise the shift to the 'how' question, and are partly behind that shift, calling for regulation. Salesforce's CEO said at Davos last year that the role of governments and regulators was to come in and "point to True North".

Now most commentators have welcomed this. Like the Commission, they add this CEO's call to the chorus ('at least they are not resisting regulation' and 'business is inviting government to lead and steer'. A good thing).

Yet is it only me who finds something hugely troubling about this statement?

It is this. Is big tech so lacking in moral substance that it needs government to point out 'True North' (a set of general principles to guide AI design and use)? 'True North' is by definition universal and fairly easy to establish. Non-discrimination, user privacy, access to review and reasons for adverse decisions. These were basic societal values last time I looked at western democracies. They do not require governmental steer or compass reading for business. Get on with it, already.

Governments must lead the responsible innovation agenda, not least because their own use of AI is a key issue. Yet on the Salesforce CEO's statement, if industry cannot arrive at these values of its own accord, we truly are far from the shallows. As Lady Gaga sings, how will we remember ourselves this way -- before AI made life unrecognisable? 

Jo

Ps -- see an earlier blog here on 'big data' and human rights, and this one from November last year putting some of these themes into a short poem... !?

Business and Human Rights in Verse: Poem 3

This is the 3rd in a mini-series of attempts to approach themes of 'Business and Human Rights' in verse. The 1st was 'Big Data' and the 2nd 'Supply Chain' (see previous two posts).

‘Dance the Guns to Silence’: some Business and Human Rights in verse

Dr Jolyon Ford

Associate Professor of Law, Australian National University

                                                                                                                                                November 2018

III.

Extractive

They came at night. It matters not,

What they did exactly, it does not matter.

Let us not try say what they took or did:

The gun will serve the highest bidder.

Across the valley the rotors’ throb

Tells us he comes to see the mines.

Beneath the ridge the scarred land drops

To where we sit and wait in lines.

The low hills crouch, they have given up.

The land is beaten down.

It too has learned this will only stop

When all sign of struggle is gone.

There is no dawn that brings them home,

No song of comfort sung.

They exist only if we remember them,

When all is said, and all is done.

From the camp we hear the shift bells ring,

This is not a place for dreaming.

You will not hear our voices sing,

But nor will you hear the screaming.

In this rich earth, a richer dust concealed,

Though we dig, it is not for truth.

Grass in the breeze where the scar has healed,

Mocks their futile defiant youth.

Some system did all this for gain,

And made our rivers burn.

It took our very soil away

And so our soul in turn.

And so here now we that remain

Mine the seams of lessons never learned,

Listen to the scoured land in its pain,

Wait without hope for their ghosts’ return.

                                                                                                                                 

Cambridge MA, 31 Oct. 2018

Business and Human Rights in Verse: Poem 2

This is the second of three attempts to approach 'business and human rights' slightly differently (for a law academic), in verse. The first attempt (previous post) was 'Big Data'. The third attempt (next week's post) is 'Extractive'.

‘Dance the Guns to Silence’: some Business and Human Rights in verse

Dr Jolyon Ford

Associate Professor of Law, Australian National University

November 2018

                                                                                                                                  

II.

Supply Chain

In these rooms where dull heat squats,

We sprawl and watch the shared screen flicker

Scenes from your world, worlds apart:

Track the thin truth that ties us together.

Do you ever just lie awake at night

And feel the ways our lives are close?

What becomes of the traces of our sweat,

In that bright world the camera shows?

What scent of humanity lingers there,

(It is a small world, after all)?

Persistent and intimate, perhaps we share

A story or secret, something small.

Bits of you come to us in waves,

Lying here watching the things you do.

Yet traces of me linger in your days,

Woven in the things we make for you.

I wake unrested and wait to wash,

We cannot leave this place.

Too tired to care where all this goes,

To think of blame, or of consequence.

You are still out there somewhere, doing

Whatever it is People do with Life.

The myriad things that fill your days

Tease our dreams through hot still nights.

The thread that weaves us does not bind,

The link does not connect;

The traces of me in space and time,

The little hope that’s left.

Stains in the hidden lining remain,

Shame too abstract to make a mark.

Something too faint to keep you awake,

Weeps unheard in this squalid dark.

The folly of our tele-dream:

To think we thought you somehow near.

For your Things we gave our self-esteem,

For such a small world, truly far.

                                                                                                     Singapore, 13 October 2018

Business and Human Rights in Verse: Poem I

This is the first of 3 efforts to approach 'business and human rights' issues in another way. Poem 1 is entitled 'Big Data'; Poem 2 'Supply Chain' and Poem 3 'Extractive':

‘Dance the Guns to Silence’: some Business and Human Rights in verse

Dr Jolyon Ford

Associate Professor of Law, Australian National University

                                                                                                                                                November 2018

I.

Big Data

Auden felt it years ago,

His senses taut and pricked with light:

The gloom that gathers when we know

We cannot know truth, or wrong from right.

Aggregate my many selves,

Average out my patterned moves;

Analyze my weakest points,

Accept the truth that the Data proves.

You are more than just the sum

Of your coded self, something more

Than the image that the moment holds.

When this drops in and tells you things

You did not know about your life,

Remember that we yearned for this;

Accept the truth that the Profile tells;

Know that if blame is even worth it now,

In truth we did this to ourselves.

                                                                                                                                 Canberra, 10 October 2018

Who is 'business and human rights' for?

Who are those doing 'business and human rights' (BHR) stuff, and for whom are they doing these things?

This post offers two reflections on the BHR 'movement'.

(I'm conscious that I'm at risk of over-thinking things about the BHR movement or 'field'. Examples of this include posts asking 'has BHR lost its way?' or one reflecting on what the field itself comprises.)

The first reflection I've used since 2016 in my Masters (LLM) course in BHR, to stimulate student thinking. It might be framed as who 'does' BHR?

The second reflection is one I offered at a recent talk at ANU's RegNet, my doctoral alma mater. It might be framed as who is BHR for?

Who 'does' BHR?

Many students study human rights with a view to 'making a difference'. Most of my students accordingly focus on classic public law and public international law subjects.

Yet -- and this is what I leave my students with each course-end -- perhaps the most effective BHR lawyers of the future will not be steeped in conventional human rights skills and knowledge. They will be people who understand contract law, corporate law, fiduciary duties of institutional investors, international trade and investment law and negotiations... they will also be students who have grasped that understanding the significance of local political economy dynamics is as important as fluency in the UN Guiding Principles on BHR: law and power, law as power.

BHR could do with more reflection, for example, on expertise, who is doing it, on how 'power law and expertise shape the global political economy' in a David Kennedy (2016) sense.

Many activists (and academics) in this field appear not only not to understand business or corporations, they sometimes seem not to want to understand them. Business and investment is something that happens out there, by some people who are probably not as nice or worldly as us.... Yet one has to question BHR strategies grounded in knee-jerk distaste for the very entities that one needs to understand (and sometimes engage with!) in order to transform problematic patterns.

Who is BHR 'for'?

Two of the BHR topics that perhaps dominate in Australia at present are (i) data, new technology and human rights; and (ii) corporate action on human rights risks in the supply chain under the intended Modern Slavery Act.

Both are important, complex, etc. Yet both, in different ways, have the effect of focusing very much on 'us' (in the first world) rather than 'them' (places where the aggregate of serious, systemic adverse BHR impacts occur).

Take the supply chains focus, which is one I'm part of. (An earlier post linked above noted that BHR is about a lot more than just 'modern slavery', as current and important and hard as that problem is).

There is a possible critique that the orientation of our current 'modern slavery' enquiries is parochial or inward looking. Its dominant vein is as follows: we must act to ensure we -- and our jurisdiction, our supermarket shelves, our wardrobes -- are not 'tainted' by association with modern slavery risk. That is not the same as saying 'we must tackle this phenomenon wherever it occurs'.

Have we succeeded if, through altered purchasing and procurement patterns (etc.) we rid Australia of any tainting trace of modern slavery, even if the phenomenon is alive and well in our region?

At least on Modern Slavery Act matters, is BHR as a movement (and so to a degree BHR scholarship) at risk of framing things as 'what can we do to rid ourselves of this human stain?' rather than 'what raft of measures will best address this topic in its own right?', that is, what works irrespective of how it affects our space?

This second reflection might be viewed as a bit unfair. After all, we (in Australia) are simply looking for ways, within our sphere of influence (so to speak), to address a global problem. And it is natural for analysis to 'begin at home' and focus on such issues. Still, its just a reflection.

Jo

Is the ethical consumer a myth?

Can informed, motivated ethical consumers act as human rights 'regulators'?

What design assumptions underpin models for regulating business human rights risk through mandated reporting?

Last week Australia's house of representatives debated the Modern Slavery Bill 2018, which would require larger Australia firms to report annually on steps taken to ensure their operations and supply chains are not tainted by human trafficking and forced labour.

The government's model would not include statutory consequences or penalties for non-compliance (non-reporting). Based as it is on s. 54 of the UK's 2015 Modern Slavery Act, the model is premised on the idea that businesses that do not report 'will be penalised by the market and consumers and severely tarnish their reputations' (Minister's 2nd reading speech, Sept. 2018).

The model is defensible in principle and regulatory theory, as I've blogged (etc.) elsewhere.

Yet as the Senate's August report noted (Recommendation 3.97), we need to 'test the proposition that reputational risk is a sufficient motivator' for widespread and meaningful reporting, and for continuous improvement in related internal due diligence practices.

A research agenda exists here since it is not obvious that consumers are likely to be effective at policing compliance with human rights performance by corporations. (Investors, insurers and other market actors may play this role more effectively, but that's not the issue in this post).

In addition to the fact that not all industry sectors face reputational risk in the same degrees or ways, we know from existing scholarship that it is not obvious (i.e. the empirical evidence is thin) that consumers will behave more ethically if they only have more information about the provenance and socio-enviro conditions under which things are extracted or made.

That is, the ethical consumer may be a 'myth' (e.g. Devinney et al 2010; Carrington et al 2010). There is an attitude-behaviour gap (Boulstridge and Carrigan 2000): even consumers who say, when surveyed, that ethical considerations matter to them do not necessarily change their consumption behaviours. Nor do they become activist consumers holding firms to account.

If so, we need to explore regulatory models premised on the idea that an informed, motivated mass consumer public will effectively hold corporate actors to account on statutory disclosure of human rights risk.

Jo

See too this previous post on modern slavery, on consumers as regulators (influencing behaviour of commercial actors): here.

Law and power, law as power

The potential and limits of law and legal analysis are questions about social, economic and political power.

My current Masters (LLM) students are in Week 6 of their fully online 'Business and Human Rights' course. We are currently discussing barriers to accessing an effective remedy for alleged business-sourced human rights violations. Much of this discussion revolves around transnational torts litigation, and the doctrinal + practical barriers to claimant groups.

In the discussions we have canvassed criminal law 'remedies' and I referred students to a news item about allegations against a French cement giant for its subsidiary's conduct in war-torn Syria (here). In one commentary on that news, the author says: 

"Human rights cases are rarely a question of law alone, they are about power."

This is an apposite for all students of 'Business and Human Rights' (BHR, and we are all students thereof!).

BHR scholars repeatedly self-profess that theirs is a  'cross-disciplinary' field that is nevertheless dominated by legal scholars. The field's maturation will require a far more systematic and contextualised engagement with the political economy and power dynamics of everything from transnational litigation to supply chain transparency.

Law can be powerful, even emancipatory; but power differentials and dynamics that constrain and distort this transformative potential need greater and more context-specific analysis by all of us working in this field.

Jo 

Has 'Business & Human Rights' lost its way?

Does 'business and human rights' risk becoming about everything, and so nothing?

What comprises the BHR 'field' is not neat and defined. It is evolving, as is the multi-faceted (but still gap-riddled) regulatory 'ecosystem' that governs business-human rights responsibility and remedy.

This lack of neatness, this open-endedness, is on one view both inevitable and desirable. We should not and probably cannot seek to be prescriptive about what 'counts' as a BHR issue.

Yet the question arises whether we should be a bit more strategic about what is likely to gain traction as a BHR issue, and about how widely we frame BHR, and about what we think corporations and other enterprises really have a meaningful responsibility for.

This post is prompted by a claim this week (here), related to litigation to this effect, that Unilever is somehow responsible for remedying the terrible human suffering of former employees resulting from post-election ethno-political violence in Kenya on the basis that some of the victims of this very complex, nation-wide violence were Unilever employees.

If by 'remedy' in BHR we really mean situations such as this, arguably BHR advocacy is over-reaching. If a demonstrably progressive firm like Unilever is accused of merely 'illusory' support for the UN Guiding Principles, how are we to foster meaningful engagement with other firms?

There are serious questions to be asked about how subsidiary corporate structures hamper access to forums for seeking effective remedy. Still, the underlying claim (that Unilever is responsible for compensating employee victims of violence that shook a whole country) has little basis in tort law, let alone human rights law. Championing this sort of speculative litigation (of all the BHR issues one could profile) shows a mindset that thinks the BHR phenomenon is far better established, far-reaching and powerful than it is. Ambition is fine; over-reach can just expose how under-developed things really are.

Just how useful and effective is the 'human rights' paradigm / lexicon in shifting business (and state) behaviour around social impact? However tempting it is to invoke it in support of all manner of worthy societal campaigns, is it really that effective?

BHR is about the many things potentially involved in preventing, minimising and remedying business-related human rights abuses (as well as encouraging and appropriately enrolling business in positive efforts at greater rights fulfilment and enjoyment). A central challenge in all this is to engage the attention of business and finance sector actors, informing and advising as well as accusing and chastising.

BHR is not just about the UN Guiding Principles or a narrow legalistic framing around the jurisprudence of international human rights law. Yet if websites or email updates on BHR become about listing all sorts of things that happen to involve companies, we have lost some powerful opportunity.

If BHR becomes about pretty much everything -- precarious work contract patterns; climate change and its governance; tax evasion and avoidance; corruption; mass political violence in east Africa -- it risks undermining itself. It risks alienating or confusing business audiences -- or being dismissed by them. It risks losing a vital connection with a credible, universal set of normative guarantees (human rights).

A related challenge is to remember that while BHR is somewhat in fashion in the field of human rights, it is still (tiringly and never-endingly) the state which must answer for the vast majority of human rights problems.

Jo

See an earlier articulation of some of the possible coherence challenges of the BHR field (2015, pp 6-7), here. See also this sceptical blog-post on linking the BHR phenomenon to climate change activism, here.

Compliance risk in 'modern slavery' reporting

The 'business and human rights' phenomenon is about much more than just 'modern slavery' in corporate supply chains.

The potential for modern slavery practices to 'taint' the supply chains of formal, regular business is one form of 'business and human rights' problem.

This post makes a brief point about a form of 'compliance risk' that may not be fully appreciated as we move, in Australia, into the process of legislative enactment and implementation of reporting requirements for larger firms around the risks of modern slavery within their operations or supply chains.

By 'compliance risk' I do not mean familiar ideas such as the reputational, regulatory, legal or other risks possibly associated with non-reporting, poor or inadequate reporting, misleading or deceptive reporting (e.g. relative to internal processes of due diligence on the reportable risk).

I mean a risk that might emerge even if a firm has very commendable due diligence and reporting practices relating to the potential for modern slavery in its business and business relationships.

The 'compliance risk' I mean is a form of unintended blindness to human rights risks in the business's sphere even though these may not be modern slavery risks.

Thus the potential problem is that once firms are actively reporting on the risks of modern slavery within their operations or supply chains (since that is what legislative requirements relate to), those firms might pay less attention to other forms of human rights risk in their business models, forms that may have nothing to do with supply chains, or with forced labour or human trafficking.

Firms (and policy-makers, and civil society) will need to keep framing these overall issues more broadly than just the current 'hot topic' of modern slavery in supply chains, and principally by reference to the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

The 'business and human rights' phenomenon is about much more than just 'modern slavery' in corporate supply chains. In Australia, a focus on a possible Modern Slavery Act has obscured or may come to obscure (including in business's perspectives) the whole range of ways in which business might unwittingly or otherwise cause, contribute to or be linked to human rights problems.

I made this point in a March 2017 post on this blog, here, shortly after the Australian government announced its consultation towards a possible Act. 

Jo

@fordthought

See a recent post (May 2018) here on defining 'supply chain' in the Modern Slavery Act reporting context, and general comments in this post from October 2017 and this one from August 2017.

Modern slavery in supply chains: definitions?

What are ideal viable regulatory models for public authorities to address the serious human rights risks that might exist in a business’s operations or supply chains, especially abroad?

This post simply pastes in the summary of a paper I've produced (here).

The paper isolates one regulatory design issue on prevailing models of statutory requirements for certain firms to report on human rights risks in their supply chain: how, if at all, should such legislation seek to define ‘supply chain’? This paper argues that this is not a narrow or merely technical question:

-          First, it affects the scope of commercial activity to which any ‘compliance’ notion will relate, and associated issues of regulatory clarity, certainty and coherence.

-          Second, the approach to defining (or not) ‘supply chain’ can be seen a metaphor for more general design philosophies or approaches. These how questions of design go to more profound questions about what ‘transparency models’ (or, more accurately, reporting models) seek to achieve. The wider public policy objective is eradicating modern slavery by engaging business and civil society in cooperative pursuit of this grand challenge. This goal ought to guide and inform all design decisions.

Some firms argue that any reporting obligations should be limited to ‘first tier’ suppliers only (direct payment relationships); many activists argue that peak firms atop particular supply chains should be obliged to report more comprehensively, i.e., full traceability reporting, on suppliers’ suppliers too. This paper argues that a future Australian Modern Slavery Act should not seek to define ‘supply chain’ at all in legislative form, nor in ancillary regulations:

·       Consistent with Pillar II of the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights, firms have a responsibility to respect human rights by (among other things) identifying and address priority human rights risks in their business operations and relationships: leaving ‘supply chain’ undefined helps avoid artificial categorisations that might obscure this ongoing exercise of self-analysis and prioritisation. The ‘how many tiers’ debate misses the point: from risk management, reputational and other perspectives too, the focus of enquiry should be the severity (scale, seriousness, etc.) of human rights risks across business relationships. Instead of responding to prescribed compliance indicators, as might happen with a defined approach, the internal corporate process of needing to self-define what one’s ‘supply chain’ will include for reporting purposes might hold value: it may help to trigger important corporate self-reflection on the extent of one’s influence or responsibility as a firm.

·       Prevailing reporting models are premised at least in part on external market, consumer and civic stakeholders ‘regulating’ corporate performance on human rights issues. In a model that does not define ‘supply chain’, these actors can always signal that a firm’s framing of its ‘supply chain’ is too narrow or otherwise misconceived. Legal, audit or assurance entities advising larger firms might be key agents in a conceivable ‘race to the top’ (at least within market leaders in some consumer-facing / reputation-exposed sectors) in terms of the quality of reporting, including the scope of a firm’s choice of what its ‘supply chain’ comprises.  

·       Reporting requirements may not actually be appropriate and adapted to the wider objective of preventing and addressing modern slavery. Nor do they necessarily produce transparency. Nevertheless, they are the model under consideration. This being so, the legislation should attempt to encourage fulsome business cooperation from a premise of trusting large Australian businesses to do the right thing in the first instance. An overall tone and message that the legislation is not unduly prescriptive on such issues as what constitutes ‘supply chain’ will probably help to generate proactive business engagement. Such cooperation is vital to the ‘bigger picture’ objective. Even the most capable regulatory state cannot ‘fix’ modern slavery in supply chains without the cooperation of the businesses that use these systems:

-          Supply chains, like business sectors, are hugely diverse, not static, and often very complex, but firms are also typically far better-placed than regulators to see or know issues within their supply chains. In a scheme premised on business uptake and cooperation, these facts suggests that legislation avoid being unduly prescriptive.

-          The point of this legislation is to help identify, prevent and resolve human rights problems in supply chains. It is not, as some activists would appear to frame it, an opportunity to target larger businesses with highly prescriptive statutory duties accompanied by punitive sanctions out of a belief (for example) that such firms, as a species, are insufficiently transparent or accountable in our society generally. The legislation is one element in a broader policy approach around finding ways to incentivise and support Australian firms to systematically identify and so prevent or address the underlying human rights risks. All design questions should turn on ‘what will best help solve the problem of modern slavery in globalised supply chains?’ and ‘how can we best involve business itself in solving these problems?’

-          Yet this cooperative dialogic approach is only justifiable if a clear signal is given that regulation will become more demanding in future if reporting compliance is perfunctory or not improving modern slavery patterns in (Australian) supply chains.

Non-binding formal policy products produced in parallel to this legislation should provide guidance to firms on the considerations involved in how they seek to define the scope of their due diligence (and so reporting) on these issues. This needs to go a lot further than the UK guidance that ‘supply chains’ under the 2015 Act has its ‘ordinary meaning’. Government should engage civil society and consultancy / assurance / audit firms in helping to produce and progressively refine such guidance.

[This is a summary from my May 2018 paper]

Jo

See a recent post on this blog on this topic here.

Data, big business and human rights

Data protection and privacy is among the most important and high-profile issues where 'business' and 'human rights' intersect.

Are some media-tech firms so large and influential that their social impact cannot be regulated? Or is the issue more about a sufficient constituency of public consumer-citizen demand for proper regulation?

This week saw news reports that Facebook may have 'improperly shared' the data of 87 million users with political consultancy Cambridge Analytica, linked to the Trump presidential campaign.

In this post I simply paste below a paragraph from a forthcoming paper I have written on how these sorts of issues and crises are treated in popular culture. Hollywood may no longer be a credible barometer or bearer of moral messaging, and nor has it yet produced the definitive movie of our age in relation to our lives online. Still, from 1995's The Net to 2015's Ex­_Machina we do see some reflection of (Western) societies' anxieties and trajectories in relation to the commodification of data and privacy issues.

This is what the paragraph says:

"... One critic describes Ex­_Machina as one examination of ‘how corporations have been freed from all forms of social responsibility in the digital age’ (Allen 2016*). That is an overstatement, but Allen does observe that in movies of this sort the issue is not so much corporate access to one’s private life as the role that individual consumers (out of apathy, convenience, ignorance, trust or other factors) play in enabling corporations to ‘take on a life of their own’ and accumulate so much potential influence over private data. The significance of this movie (or more accurately this type of movie -- it was not a blockbuster) might lie in what it tells us about the mix of regulation vs. consumer preferences in this and other areas of corporate ethics and responsibility. After all, if informed consumers are not motivated to press home data-related human rights concerns in any concerted way, what are the prospects for influencing, expanding and sustaining corporate self-regulation or industry or state regulation to protect those same concerns?"

How does this relate to current debate on Facebook's data management?

Consumers do need to know and understand issues before they can be a constituency of demand for better regulatory interventions.

But social media and other technologies may be so convenient and/or seductive that if the balance of regulation on data privacy ends up not favouring the individual, it may not be that we are all the blameless victims of some elaborate corporate strategy to undermine human rights.

It may be that we have done this to ourselves.

Jo

* Allen, A., (2016) ‘How the ‘Evil Corporation’ Became a Pop-Culture Trope’ The Atlantic, 25 April 2016.

Regulating modern slavery in supply chains

What viable but principled regulatory model is best suited to regulating business supply-chains to ensure that they do not tolerate or promote forced labour, human trafficking, etc ('modern slavery')?

Does legislation that requires corporate reporting on measures taken within one's supply-chain to address these risks -- but which does not imposes statutory consequences for not complying -- have a place here?

Many activists argue 'Not'.

I would disagree. One can be highly motivated about addressing modern slavery in business supply-chains, yet support legislative models that others dismiss as 'undemanding'.

Australia is proposing a legislative model on this issue, drawing on s. 54 of the UK's 2015 Modern Slavery Act. The consultation on the proposed approach closed last week. (See the Consultation Paper here).

Last week I made a lengthy submission to that consultation.

Here is the gist...:

• If the aim is to foster business engagement in preventing and solving the underlying problems, a model that give businesses space to address its operations and supply chains (which they know better than any regulator could), that is not prescriptive about reporting, and that does not impose penalties for non-compliance is defensible ... 

... but only ....

• If the model clearly signals to business that more demanding / intrusive regulation is conditionally being held in reserve for a period, and will be implemented if the uptake by business is merely perfunctory and the reporting patterns do not indicate proper engagement in due diligence and other processes to identify, prevent, resolve and remedy human rights risks...

The current proposed model does not include penalties for non-compliance with the reporting requirement. Yet it makes no overt or explicit signal to business that there may be more demanding legislation in future if business uptake and response is weak.

This is from the intro to that submission, making the above points:

"... The point of all this is not the adoption of ‘tough’ regulatory postures for their own sake (even if these were politically viable): instead the point is to find ways to incentivise and support Australian entities to systematically identify and to prevent or address the underlying human rights risks...

... many features [of the proposed legislation] which this submission supports (such as refraining from any statutory consequences for non-reporting) are ultimately only justifiable, or likely to be received as legitimate by civil society, on a certain condition. This is that there ought to be a clear, signalled government message to business that government ... is prepared in future to consider more intrusive, demanding legislative measures if it is found that the proposed approach is not engendering meaningful engagement with the problem..."

JF

See previous posts on 'modern slavery' and its regulation (in Australia and generally), most recently here.

Responsible business in a Trump era (III)

Just how compelling is the 'business case' for firms and funds to adopt and implement human rights policies?

Here I mean planning, self-assessment and reporting policies and systems that are explicitly framed in human rights terms -- not the wider idea of a 'business case' for being socially responsible.

Among the outgoing Obama administration's last actions in December 2016 was to shepherd in a US 'National Action Plan' on 'Business and Human Rights' (BHR).

The evidence so far shows clearly that a Trump-led US federal government will not lead, in policy, messaging and regulatory terms, in the BHR area. Indeed it will evidently not do so on the responsible or even sustainable business agendas more broadly.

If that is so, it may nevertheless happen that in the US and beyond, big business and the financial and insurance worlds drive parts of this broad agenda itself, not waiting for a national government lead.*

With important caveats, I have recently blogged on this possibility.** These blog-posts were offered in the search for a 'silver lining', from a BHR perspective, to Trump's election. Of course European governments + the EU (and others) might lead in America's stead. But the US matters.

If it happens that business does not wait for such a lead, it may be because there is a perceived 'business case' for it (even if part of that case is just longer-term anticipation by business of a degree of reversion in regulatory trends in a post-Trump presidency).

The 'business case' concept in the BHR field derives from the wider corporate accountability / responsibility field. It is a familiar feature of the CSR field, in particular. 

'Business case' is of course shorthand for the idea that whatever the ethical, moral or legal reasons for mitigating a business's social, enviro and governance impact, it makes good commercial sense, especially in the longer term, to embrace this agenda.

We need to be cautious about a 'business case' at the broad level: business sectors and sub-sectors -- and individual firms within these -- may have very different incentive structures (etc.) in responding to or anticipating social impact issues. The 'business case' concept is a more sound one when describing how those incentives etc might be approached in particular contexts, making a case each time.

For years the CSR and then emerging BHR fields spent considerable energy on articulating a general 'business case'. Yet in recent years BHR advocacy has sometimes appeared to proceed on the basis not only that the business case for acting on human rights risks is self-evident, but that it is or will go further and become an important driver of uptake by business of the BHR implementation agenda.

The thrust of the current post is to suggest that the Trump era will now put to the test claims made in recent years about the strength and obviousness and appeal of the business case for self-starting action on human rights risk.

Put another way (and partly for provocation's sake), it is easy to assert the existence of an obvious business case for business to be pro-active about addressing human rights impacts, but we need to be careful about assuming that this has some sort of self-executing logic to it.

At very least, it seems unlikely that all aspects of BHR will advance at equal pace and degree. Parts of some sectors in business may go with some aspects of the BHR agenda (eg 'modern slavery' in supply chains), while not on others; we may see uptake on some measures (eg human rights due diligence in larger listed firms and financial houses), but little movement in areas such as access to remedy.

Of course many would argue that because human rights are universal non-negotiable normative imperatives, emphasising the commercial advantages of investing in a human rights-consistent business is a wrong starting-place to 'motivate and justify' corporate engagement in human rights implementation.*** This is partly the thrust of a recent Harvard Business Review article entitled 'We shouldn't always need a business case to do the right thing'.

I think there is unarguably a business case for some kinds and sizes of firms to take the BHR agenda seriously. Demonstrating empirically that such action protects or creates commercial value is more difficult.

Jo

* This comment relates to the federal government: the same reactionary approach to promoting sustainable and responsible business conduct is not necessarily true of state-level governments in the US, some of them major economies in their own right, such as California.
** My previous posts on 'responsible business in a Trump era' are here (February 2017) and here (November 2016).

*** See Posner and Baumann-Pauly, 'Making the Business Case for Human Rights', in Baumann-Pauly and Nolan 2016, section 1.2.