Modern Slavery reporting laws: a study

One way in which the 'business and human rights' agenda is manifesting in national-level laws is through legislation -- most recently in Australia -- to require larger firms to report periodically on risks of 'modern slavery' within their operations and supply chains.

We have produced a report on how Australian firms appear to be preparing to reporting under the 2018 Modern Slavery Act.

Is the Act at risk of become a mere tick-box exercise, or will it help drive a more fundamental transformation of approaches to human rights risks in supply chains:

"... Despite mixed levels of awareness, a common refrain in interviews was that the reporting requirement was a ‘conversation starter’ (including, importantly, within firms) even if not a ‘conversation changer’, although for some it had achieved the latter..."

Here is a link to the report (with M. Azizul Islam and Justine Nolan).

Jo

Ps: for some recent blogs on reporting laws on Modern Slavery, see this post (and links within).

Modern slavery reporting: what it is/not

Some legislative schemes have unforeseen consequences on the upside. They achieve far more than their particular remit, and capture or catalyse a wider shift.

Others generate unreasonable expectations: laws can only do so much, even in developed regulatory states, and especially without the accompaniment of more profound and clear messages from markets and people about the kinds of behavioural and cultural changes they want companies to exhibit.

Australia's Modern Slavery Act came into effect this year. It requires larger firms report annually on whether and what steps they are taking to manage these human rights risks within their operations and supply chains.

Last week the government released draft guidance for reporting entities (here).

In this context I attempt 3 propositions about what this statutory scheme may represent, and 3 things that it doesn't necessarily represent: what is it not?

'What it maybe is'

1. The Act is -- like its UK predecessor and whatever its shortcomings -- a landmark achievement in bringing to corporate boards across Australia a new awareness of the human rights risks sometimes associated with mainstream business and financial activity, and the extent of regulatory intent that exists around these.

2. The Australian Act can be seen as part of a wider pattern, at least in OECD countries, of statutory requirements to undertake human rights due diligence or at least report on such activities -- even if domestic and other regulatory manifestations of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are still very piecemeal.

3. Engagement with the Act by corporations (and their advisory firms) on this particular human rights risk may drive wider awareness and uptake of the fuller 'business and human rights' agenda, but will not necessarily do so.*

'What it perhaps is not'

1. The Act is one corporate reporting mechanism among many for big firms (and modern slavery is only one class of business & human rights issue): as the Act beds down there are no guarantees that this will remain a distinctive high-profile issue ...

2. An external reporting requirement (even one with board-level sign-off) is no guarantee that firms and funds will take and sustain effective internal procedural, operational and cultural changes relevant to preventing and remedying modern slavery risk.

3. Even fulsome corporate compliance with the Act (and internalisation of its purpose) will not necessarily have a discernible or material effect on the prevalence of modern slavery in our region.

That last point is a reminder of the risk of such legislation becoming an Australian regulatory salve for our own consciences (here).

There are many other things one could add about what the Act is not. The Act is not a panacea. The Act is not mere pandering to corporations. The Act is not victim-focused or remedial in nature.

And so on. For one thing, advocates and academics in 'business and human rights' often talk of these corporate reporting models as new. They are not. They are only new to this field, which would benefit from more research couched in lessons about what reporting requirements, and non-penal ones in particular, can and cannot do to drive progress on the underlying issue with which they deal. 

Jo

* In 2018 research with Justine Nolan and M. Azizul Islam (publication forthcoming) we observe that many corporate officers and others see the Act as, at very least, a 'conversation starter' within firms and more widely.

See here for a recent post on compliance risk under the Act, and here for a different take (modern slavery approached in verse...).

Business and Human Rights in Verse: Poem 2

This is the second of three attempts to approach 'business and human rights' slightly differently (for a law academic), in verse. The first attempt (previous post) was 'Big Data'. The third attempt (next week's post) is 'Extractive'.

‘Dance the Guns to Silence’: some Business and Human Rights in verse

Dr Jolyon Ford

Associate Professor of Law, Australian National University

November 2018

                                                                                                                                  

II.

Supply Chain

In these rooms where dull heat squats,

We sprawl and watch the shared screen flicker

Scenes from your world, worlds apart:

Track the thin truth that ties us together.

Do you ever just lie awake at night

And feel the ways our lives are close?

What becomes of the traces of our sweat,

In that bright world the camera shows?

What scent of humanity lingers there,

(It is a small world, after all)?

Persistent and intimate, perhaps we share

A story or secret, something small.

Bits of you come to us in waves,

Lying here watching the things you do.

Yet traces of me linger in your days,

Woven in the things we make for you.

I wake unrested and wait to wash,

We cannot leave this place.

Too tired to care where all this goes,

To think of blame, or of consequence.

You are still out there somewhere, doing

Whatever it is People do with Life.

The myriad things that fill your days

Tease our dreams through hot still nights.

The thread that weaves us does not bind,

The link does not connect;

The traces of me in space and time,

The little hope that’s left.

Stains in the hidden lining remain,

Shame too abstract to make a mark.

Something too faint to keep you awake,

Weeps unheard in this squalid dark.

The folly of our tele-dream:

To think we thought you somehow near.

For your Things we gave our self-esteem,

For such a small world, truly far.

                                                                                                     Singapore, 13 October 2018

Who is 'business and human rights' for?

Who are those doing 'business and human rights' (BHR) stuff, and for whom are they doing these things?

This post offers two reflections on the BHR 'movement'.

(I'm conscious that I'm at risk of over-thinking things about the BHR movement or 'field'. Examples of this include posts asking 'has BHR lost its way?' or one reflecting on what the field itself comprises.)

The first reflection I've used since 2016 in my Masters (LLM) course in BHR, to stimulate student thinking. It might be framed as who 'does' BHR?

The second reflection is one I offered at a recent talk at ANU's RegNet, my doctoral alma mater. It might be framed as who is BHR for?

Who 'does' BHR?

Many students study human rights with a view to 'making a difference'. Most of my students accordingly focus on classic public law and public international law subjects.

Yet -- and this is what I leave my students with each course-end -- perhaps the most effective BHR lawyers of the future will not be steeped in conventional human rights skills and knowledge. They will be people who understand contract law, corporate law, fiduciary duties of institutional investors, international trade and investment law and negotiations... they will also be students who have grasped that understanding the significance of local political economy dynamics is as important as fluency in the UN Guiding Principles on BHR: law and power, law as power.

BHR could do with more reflection, for example, on expertise, who is doing it, on how 'power law and expertise shape the global political economy' in a David Kennedy (2016) sense.

Many activists (and academics) in this field appear not only not to understand business or corporations, they sometimes seem not to want to understand them. Business and investment is something that happens out there, by some people who are probably not as nice or worldly as us.... Yet one has to question BHR strategies grounded in knee-jerk distaste for the very entities that one needs to understand (and sometimes engage with!) in order to transform problematic patterns.

Who is BHR 'for'?

Two of the BHR topics that perhaps dominate in Australia at present are (i) data, new technology and human rights; and (ii) corporate action on human rights risks in the supply chain under the intended Modern Slavery Act.

Both are important, complex, etc. Yet both, in different ways, have the effect of focusing very much on 'us' (in the first world) rather than 'them' (places where the aggregate of serious, systemic adverse BHR impacts occur).

Take the supply chains focus, which is one I'm part of. (An earlier post linked above noted that BHR is about a lot more than just 'modern slavery', as current and important and hard as that problem is).

There is a possible critique that the orientation of our current 'modern slavery' enquiries is parochial or inward looking. Its dominant vein is as follows: we must act to ensure we -- and our jurisdiction, our supermarket shelves, our wardrobes -- are not 'tainted' by association with modern slavery risk. That is not the same as saying 'we must tackle this phenomenon wherever it occurs'.

Have we succeeded if, through altered purchasing and procurement patterns (etc.) we rid Australia of any tainting trace of modern slavery, even if the phenomenon is alive and well in our region?

At least on Modern Slavery Act matters, is BHR as a movement (and so to a degree BHR scholarship) at risk of framing things as 'what can we do to rid ourselves of this human stain?' rather than 'what raft of measures will best address this topic in its own right?', that is, what works irrespective of how it affects our space?

This second reflection might be viewed as a bit unfair. After all, we (in Australia) are simply looking for ways, within our sphere of influence (so to speak), to address a global problem. And it is natural for analysis to 'begin at home' and focus on such issues. Still, its just a reflection.

Jo

Is the ethical consumer a myth?

Can informed, motivated ethical consumers act as human rights 'regulators'?

What design assumptions underpin models for regulating business human rights risk through mandated reporting?

Last week Australia's house of representatives debated the Modern Slavery Bill 2018, which would require larger Australia firms to report annually on steps taken to ensure their operations and supply chains are not tainted by human trafficking and forced labour.

The government's model would not include statutory consequences or penalties for non-compliance (non-reporting). Based as it is on s. 54 of the UK's 2015 Modern Slavery Act, the model is premised on the idea that businesses that do not report 'will be penalised by the market and consumers and severely tarnish their reputations' (Minister's 2nd reading speech, Sept. 2018).

The model is defensible in principle and regulatory theory, as I've blogged (etc.) elsewhere.

Yet as the Senate's August report noted (Recommendation 3.97), we need to 'test the proposition that reputational risk is a sufficient motivator' for widespread and meaningful reporting, and for continuous improvement in related internal due diligence practices.

A research agenda exists here since it is not obvious that consumers are likely to be effective at policing compliance with human rights performance by corporations. (Investors, insurers and other market actors may play this role more effectively, but that's not the issue in this post).

In addition to the fact that not all industry sectors face reputational risk in the same degrees or ways, we know from existing scholarship that it is not obvious (i.e. the empirical evidence is thin) that consumers will behave more ethically if they only have more information about the provenance and socio-enviro conditions under which things are extracted or made.

That is, the ethical consumer may be a 'myth' (e.g. Devinney et al 2010; Carrington et al 2010). There is an attitude-behaviour gap (Boulstridge and Carrigan 2000): even consumers who say, when surveyed, that ethical considerations matter to them do not necessarily change their consumption behaviours. Nor do they become activist consumers holding firms to account.

If so, we need to explore regulatory models premised on the idea that an informed, motivated mass consumer public will effectively hold corporate actors to account on statutory disclosure of human rights risk.

Jo

See too this previous post on modern slavery, on consumers as regulators (influencing behaviour of commercial actors): here.

Compliance risk in 'modern slavery' reporting

The 'business and human rights' phenomenon is about much more than just 'modern slavery' in corporate supply chains.

The potential for modern slavery practices to 'taint' the supply chains of formal, regular business is one form of 'business and human rights' problem.

This post makes a brief point about a form of 'compliance risk' that may not be fully appreciated as we move, in Australia, into the process of legislative enactment and implementation of reporting requirements for larger firms around the risks of modern slavery within their operations or supply chains.

By 'compliance risk' I do not mean familiar ideas such as the reputational, regulatory, legal or other risks possibly associated with non-reporting, poor or inadequate reporting, misleading or deceptive reporting (e.g. relative to internal processes of due diligence on the reportable risk).

I mean a risk that might emerge even if a firm has very commendable due diligence and reporting practices relating to the potential for modern slavery in its business and business relationships.

The 'compliance risk' I mean is a form of unintended blindness to human rights risks in the business's sphere even though these may not be modern slavery risks.

Thus the potential problem is that once firms are actively reporting on the risks of modern slavery within their operations or supply chains (since that is what legislative requirements relate to), those firms might pay less attention to other forms of human rights risk in their business models, forms that may have nothing to do with supply chains, or with forced labour or human trafficking.

Firms (and policy-makers, and civil society) will need to keep framing these overall issues more broadly than just the current 'hot topic' of modern slavery in supply chains, and principally by reference to the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

The 'business and human rights' phenomenon is about much more than just 'modern slavery' in corporate supply chains. In Australia, a focus on a possible Modern Slavery Act has obscured or may come to obscure (including in business's perspectives) the whole range of ways in which business might unwittingly or otherwise cause, contribute to or be linked to human rights problems.

I made this point in a March 2017 post on this blog, here, shortly after the Australian government announced its consultation towards a possible Act. 

Jo

@fordthought

See a recent post (May 2018) here on defining 'supply chain' in the Modern Slavery Act reporting context, and general comments in this post from October 2017 and this one from August 2017.

Modern slavery in supply chains: definitions?

What are ideal viable regulatory models for public authorities to address the serious human rights risks that might exist in a business’s operations or supply chains, especially abroad?

This post simply pastes in the summary of a paper I've produced (here).

The paper isolates one regulatory design issue on prevailing models of statutory requirements for certain firms to report on human rights risks in their supply chain: how, if at all, should such legislation seek to define ‘supply chain’? This paper argues that this is not a narrow or merely technical question:

-          First, it affects the scope of commercial activity to which any ‘compliance’ notion will relate, and associated issues of regulatory clarity, certainty and coherence.

-          Second, the approach to defining (or not) ‘supply chain’ can be seen a metaphor for more general design philosophies or approaches. These how questions of design go to more profound questions about what ‘transparency models’ (or, more accurately, reporting models) seek to achieve. The wider public policy objective is eradicating modern slavery by engaging business and civil society in cooperative pursuit of this grand challenge. This goal ought to guide and inform all design decisions.

Some firms argue that any reporting obligations should be limited to ‘first tier’ suppliers only (direct payment relationships); many activists argue that peak firms atop particular supply chains should be obliged to report more comprehensively, i.e., full traceability reporting, on suppliers’ suppliers too. This paper argues that a future Australian Modern Slavery Act should not seek to define ‘supply chain’ at all in legislative form, nor in ancillary regulations:

·       Consistent with Pillar II of the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights, firms have a responsibility to respect human rights by (among other things) identifying and address priority human rights risks in their business operations and relationships: leaving ‘supply chain’ undefined helps avoid artificial categorisations that might obscure this ongoing exercise of self-analysis and prioritisation. The ‘how many tiers’ debate misses the point: from risk management, reputational and other perspectives too, the focus of enquiry should be the severity (scale, seriousness, etc.) of human rights risks across business relationships. Instead of responding to prescribed compliance indicators, as might happen with a defined approach, the internal corporate process of needing to self-define what one’s ‘supply chain’ will include for reporting purposes might hold value: it may help to trigger important corporate self-reflection on the extent of one’s influence or responsibility as a firm.

·       Prevailing reporting models are premised at least in part on external market, consumer and civic stakeholders ‘regulating’ corporate performance on human rights issues. In a model that does not define ‘supply chain’, these actors can always signal that a firm’s framing of its ‘supply chain’ is too narrow or otherwise misconceived. Legal, audit or assurance entities advising larger firms might be key agents in a conceivable ‘race to the top’ (at least within market leaders in some consumer-facing / reputation-exposed sectors) in terms of the quality of reporting, including the scope of a firm’s choice of what its ‘supply chain’ comprises.  

·       Reporting requirements may not actually be appropriate and adapted to the wider objective of preventing and addressing modern slavery. Nor do they necessarily produce transparency. Nevertheless, they are the model under consideration. This being so, the legislation should attempt to encourage fulsome business cooperation from a premise of trusting large Australian businesses to do the right thing in the first instance. An overall tone and message that the legislation is not unduly prescriptive on such issues as what constitutes ‘supply chain’ will probably help to generate proactive business engagement. Such cooperation is vital to the ‘bigger picture’ objective. Even the most capable regulatory state cannot ‘fix’ modern slavery in supply chains without the cooperation of the businesses that use these systems:

-          Supply chains, like business sectors, are hugely diverse, not static, and often very complex, but firms are also typically far better-placed than regulators to see or know issues within their supply chains. In a scheme premised on business uptake and cooperation, these facts suggests that legislation avoid being unduly prescriptive.

-          The point of this legislation is to help identify, prevent and resolve human rights problems in supply chains. It is not, as some activists would appear to frame it, an opportunity to target larger businesses with highly prescriptive statutory duties accompanied by punitive sanctions out of a belief (for example) that such firms, as a species, are insufficiently transparent or accountable in our society generally. The legislation is one element in a broader policy approach around finding ways to incentivise and support Australian firms to systematically identify and so prevent or address the underlying human rights risks. All design questions should turn on ‘what will best help solve the problem of modern slavery in globalised supply chains?’ and ‘how can we best involve business itself in solving these problems?’

-          Yet this cooperative dialogic approach is only justifiable if a clear signal is given that regulation will become more demanding in future if reporting compliance is perfunctory or not improving modern slavery patterns in (Australian) supply chains.

Non-binding formal policy products produced in parallel to this legislation should provide guidance to firms on the considerations involved in how they seek to define the scope of their due diligence (and so reporting) on these issues. This needs to go a lot further than the UK guidance that ‘supply chains’ under the 2015 Act has its ‘ordinary meaning’. Government should engage civil society and consultancy / assurance / audit firms in helping to produce and progressively refine such guidance.

[This is a summary from my May 2018 paper]

Jo

See a recent post on this blog on this topic here.

Regulating modern slavery in supply chains

What viable but principled regulatory model is best suited to regulating business supply-chains to ensure that they do not tolerate or promote forced labour, human trafficking, etc ('modern slavery')?

Does legislation that requires corporate reporting on measures taken within one's supply-chain to address these risks -- but which does not imposes statutory consequences for not complying -- have a place here?

Many activists argue 'Not'.

I would disagree. One can be highly motivated about addressing modern slavery in business supply-chains, yet support legislative models that others dismiss as 'undemanding'.

Australia is proposing a legislative model on this issue, drawing on s. 54 of the UK's 2015 Modern Slavery Act. The consultation on the proposed approach closed last week. (See the Consultation Paper here).

Last week I made a lengthy submission to that consultation.

Here is the gist...:

• If the aim is to foster business engagement in preventing and solving the underlying problems, a model that give businesses space to address its operations and supply chains (which they know better than any regulator could), that is not prescriptive about reporting, and that does not impose penalties for non-compliance is defensible ... 

... but only ....

• If the model clearly signals to business that more demanding / intrusive regulation is conditionally being held in reserve for a period, and will be implemented if the uptake by business is merely perfunctory and the reporting patterns do not indicate proper engagement in due diligence and other processes to identify, prevent, resolve and remedy human rights risks...

The current proposed model does not include penalties for non-compliance with the reporting requirement. Yet it makes no overt or explicit signal to business that there may be more demanding legislation in future if business uptake and response is weak.

This is from the intro to that submission, making the above points:

"... The point of all this is not the adoption of ‘tough’ regulatory postures for their own sake (even if these were politically viable): instead the point is to find ways to incentivise and support Australian entities to systematically identify and to prevent or address the underlying human rights risks...

... many features [of the proposed legislation] which this submission supports (such as refraining from any statutory consequences for non-reporting) are ultimately only justifiable, or likely to be received as legitimate by civil society, on a certain condition. This is that there ought to be a clear, signalled government message to business that government ... is prepared in future to consider more intrusive, demanding legislative measures if it is found that the proposed approach is not engendering meaningful engagement with the problem..."

JF

See previous posts on 'modern slavery' and its regulation (in Australia and generally), most recently here.

Corporate supply chains and modern slavery

What are some factors in regulating corporate action and transparency on human rights risks across supply chains?

Today I present* to an Australian parliamentary enquiry into whether the country should adopt legislation similar to the UK's Modern Slavery Act 2015, in particular s. 54 of that Act, which requires larger UK firms to publish a statement on whether they've taken steps to address human trafficking and forced labour in their operations or supply chain.

I've included a link below to the full written submission that I speak to (and 200 or so other submissions from government, businesses and industry groups, civil society and others).

This post is to make 5 general reflective comments, briefly:

1. 'Great expectations': many submissions over-state the regulatory reach and effect of both a government such as Australia and large companies in respect of their supply chains. While advocates want to draw the 'business and human rights' paradigm into service in addressing many of the imbalances and inequities of the globalised production system, we need to keep perspective. Legislation addressing 'modern slavery' in Australian corporate supply chains is important and can have some practical and messaging effects. But the phenomenon reflects deep governance capacity and incentive problems in developing countries. Such problems cannot be 'fixed' by even the most comprehensive and sophisticated regulation in investor-sending countries.

2. 'Definitions matter': while many submissions address problems in labour conditions here and abroad, 'slavery' is not a term to be bandied about in the hope of larger reform to such conditions. It reflects the oldest, strongest-pedigree norm in international human rights law. It is not to be diluted, tempting as it is to recruit the rhetorical power of 'human rights' in service of all sorts of campaigns.

3. 'Government lead': any requirement that large firms address these risks in their supply chains should arguably also apply to at least large federal government procurement behaviours, if only because government must lead by example. This much is clear from Pillar I of the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, unanimously adopted by UN member states on the Human Rights Council.

4. 'Compliance tunnel vision': we should aim at regulation that encourages and incentivises all stakeholders to work together to prevent and remedy these complex problems. Legislation that creates highly process-focused requirements has the risk of diverting attention to narrow procedural cultures of compliance, which become 'rituals' of their own (Charlesworth and Larking 2010-2015, developing John Braithwaite's work) and become the point of the exercise -- rather than solving the underlying problem.

5. 'Messaging': related to (3) above, it is cost-free for government simply to state its expectation that businesses will comply with human rights standards and remedy their breach where established. This does not sound like 'regulation', but such messaging may be the most importand and influential form of influencing corporate conduct, and signalling the possibility of intervention in future.

Jo

* I present also on behalf of Justine Nolan, co-author of our joint submission to the enquiry and a leading scholar in this field. That submission can be found on the Enquiry's website, here. For the Enquiry's Terms of Reference, see here.

PS: for a recent blog post I did on this issue in the Australian context (but making more general points), see here.

Modern slavery: consumers, regulators, companies

"... Debate continues over whether 21 or 40-plus million people live and work in slavery-like conditions. Either number is unacceptably high in the 21^st century.

Yet addressing modern slavery is not only a job for government or bigger businesses: a critical mass of informed proactive consumers will surely be as significant as law-making..." 

So I argue in a blog-post on another forum, on Australia's moves towards a Modern Slavery Act, incorporating corporate transparency requirements of one form or another.

Here is a link to that blog-post.

https://www.policyforum.net/consumers-must-join-business-government-addressing-modern-slavery/

JF

ps -- see previous blog-post on this issue on this blog, that 'business and human rights' is about more than corporate supply-chains, modern slavery, and transparency legislation ... even tho these are big enough in themselves: here.